Last week was supposed to be a big showdown at the Harvard Law School
on whether Steve Keen is double counting when he aggregates demand from income and the change in debt.
To look at the absurdly close correlations between the change in debt,
the second derivative -- the so-called credit accelerator -- and
employment, you have to conclude No. This is massively explanatory
One participant in a session with Keen at the Fields Institute last year
opined that the dispute was a matter of ex-ante and ex-post
observations, and that the issue would be settled if Keen simply
changed terminology from aggregate demand to effective demand. It was the ex ante force that John Maynard Keynes had meant in his discussions of
demand.
I'm personally not certain anything is
explained by aggregate demand if all we are aggregating is income. In
combining the change in debt with income, we are aggregating one side.
And as I say, it is hugely explanatory regarding employment.
We
might aggregate consumption and investment spending, but that will be
ex-post as well, and in fact, the dividing line between consumption and
investment is not particularly dark Cars are investment for a
household, and even stocks of tuna fish or the contents of a freezer.
Investment goods when manufactured by a business get a big bright bow and
all kinds of tax favors. Investment goods built by the local sanitary
sewer district or the state's department of transportation get no such
bow. They might be eligible for bonds, but normally it's just spending with no positive product.
And in aggregate demand we are in one sense simply trying to close the spending gap, so we have
adequate demand to employ everybody. It doesn't really matter whether
it's consumption or investment.
Except when it comes to the debt load and debt financing.
That
is, if we borrow to spend, we ought to want that borrowing to produce a
tool or educated person or piece of infrastructure or plant that will
generate the revenue to pay back the loan out of increased goods or
services. A "productive" investment. If we borrow to consume, we have
set ourselves a problem. And if we borrow to speculate, we have set the
whole economy a problem.
Nonsense economics claims that
all government can do is spend. Quite the opposite is the case. There is
very little government does, aside from the much rumored rampant
corruption and the occasional sports arena that is not some sort of
public good, social or physical infrastructure. Give me an example, if
you will, of blatant government spending.
The public
pension program of social security? No. It is a transfer program, a
self-contained public pension program. Government spends nothing, it is
all done by the recipients, less a tiny overhead charge. You might say
that welfare is simple spending. Subsidizing the poor and indigent up to
subsistence. But if that is as close to wasteful spending as you can
get, that's pretty sad. And if everyone had a job, the ragbag of public
programs could be put away by reason of income.
A
footnote: Full employment is the law. Bank profitability is not the
law. In the full Employment Act of 1946 Congress made full employment
the target of government activity. In the Full Employment and Balanced
Growth Act of 1978, they updated and reinforced it. But what's a law
these days, eh? Can you hear me now?
Let's return to the
idea that we want to borrow money mostly to invest in productive
activities, not so much to consume, and never to speculate.
And
I get it that the government doesn't need to borrow in order to spend.
The whole exercise with the Fed buying Treasuries illustrates if nothing
else that the public doesn't need to cough up any cash for the
government to spend. So I get that. We are printing plenty of money,
it is not causing inflation, but the reason for that is that the money
is not being spent, so it is not entering the money supply. Another
recent Steve Keen paper displayed how QE can migrate from the Fed to the
banks and never stir up the real economy. Its only plumage is when the
banks buy shares, as Keen calls them, stocks. Money might trickle out
there. But it could also simply be absorbed in the stock prices.
One analyst suggested, in fact, that 85% of the S&P's performance was correlated with QE.
The idea that we want productive assets for our borrowed money does have some firm roots.
One,
it is much easier to sell the public on, "Let's buy infrastructure,
education, or relief from the climate chaos," than it is, "Let's spend
out of thin air." Even though this is what they support with the Great
and Marvelous Bernanke.
Two,
if we are expanding the number of productive loans, we are expanding
the hedge financing in Minsky's financing structures. That is, as
Minsky described the progression, from hedge, or productive financing,
through speculative, or rollover financing, into Ponzi
financing. The reach for yield leads investors into ever more risky
ventures. But were they leaving productive investments on the table
because the yield was too low? Certainly this is one reading of Keynes
and Minsky. But what if thousands of productive investments were passed
over because the markets had no access to public goods? What if
seawalls or levees costing hundreds of millions were left unbuilt
and storm damage incurred in the billions that might have been
avoided. (I guess we should eliminate the double negative: If a
project costing one hundred million saved two or three billion, THERE is
a productive investment.) The fact that this prudent investment is
invisible, or the benefits of good education, or even the efficiency of
good transportation infrastructure, is a matter of politics, not
economics ... cost and benefit It is not the rate of return on these
projects, but the fact that they are in the public realm that prevents
their being undertaken. These are high return-low risk operations when
the natural payment mechanism for public goods is operable -- that would
be taxes. But we know from our political study that taxes are not
really just the way we pay for public goods, taxes are instead the fangs
of a vampire government. Or to be less hysterical, I guess I should
just say that the natural financing mechanism for these high return
investments is clogged by petty minds.
Let's take an example. The president of CSX,
the big Eastern rail company, says in this clip that railroads have
plenty of cash flow for buybacks and dividends, but not so much for
investment. Why? They are too busy making money shipping bulk coal and
oil on present track, squeezing the little guys and pushing low profit
freight onto the highways, not to mention passenger. The other hand is
busy thumbing their noses at the public interest. Well. He doesn't say
it quite like that. You listen.
Sunday, June 16, 2013
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