Said Leon Keyserling 35 years ago as he looked in frustration at the onset of the largest post-war recession prior to our 2008 Great Recession, the Reagan-Volcker Double Dip recession of 1979-1982. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 had been passed by large majorities in both houses of Congress to deal with the problem. The Act was promptly and nearly completely ignored by first Jimmy Carter and then Ronald Reagan.
It was in this context that Keyserling produced one of his best works, "Liberal" and "Conservative" National Economic Policies and their Consequences, 1919-1979, subtitled: "A Study to Help Implement Promptly the Humphrey-Hawkins Act."
Leon Keyserling was one of the most successful economists in American history in terms of getting significant legislation passed, influencing public policy over a long term, and seeing results in the performance of GDP, inflation, employment, growth and national well-being. He had a hand in the Wagner Act of the New Deal (1935), also known as the National Labor Relations Act. He claimed to have modeled the Full Employment Act of 1946, which was probably the single most important piece of economics legislation in the country's history. And he participated in and influenced greatly the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. Keyserling was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, then chair, under Harry Truman, and helped immensely in the transition from war to peace and managing the economy into a period of prosperity.
"Balanced growth" was Keyserling's vision of how successful economics and public policy operated, as a partnership between labor (consumers), business (and investors), and the government (public sector). The problem Keyserling saw in 1979 was overcapacity, resulting in a reduction in investment and recession. The condition of overcapacity was a function not only of overbuilding, but of under-consumption and a deficiency in government outlays. "Balanced" growth was a coordinated expansion in each of these three components. Investment was necessary, but could not run ahead of consumption, or the profits would not ratify the investment, prompting cut-backs and recession. Sufficient federal outlays were necessary to provide the foundation for investment and consumption and to address the nation's overarching priorities.
Keyserling saw over-investment as a problem virtually throughout the "conservative" period beginning with Richard Nixon in 1969. The federal budget, both its spending and its taxing sides, promoted ever more investment, more capacity. "Belt-tightening" was prescribed for spending -- wonderful if you're a household, but seriously negligent and lazy if you're a family farm or a government with responsibilities. There was no aggressive effort to expand employment or incomes, quite the opposite. National priorities, such as energy independence, were left to half-hearted measures. Not surprisingly, this was the era that spawned the great divergence of incomes, the inequality that has now become corrosive and destabilizing to the society.
We listen to Keyserling in 1979 and we think, "We would be lucky to have these problems."
Compared with the attainable goals under appropriate changes in national economic policies and programs, the likely and very disturbing results of the projection of current national policies ... are: An average annual real economic growth rate of only 3.0 percent from 1979 to 1980, and the same average from 1979 to 1983; a productivity growth rate averaging only 1.8 percent throughout; an inflation rate of 9.0 percent in 1980 and 7.5 percent in 1983; real growth in federal outlays of only 2.5 percent during the first year and averaging only 2.2 percent during the period as a whole; and an unemployment rate of 6.8 percent for 1979 and averaging 6.5 percent for the whole period.
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The President's [Carter's] goal for real economic growth is 3.3 percent from 1978 to 1979, and this has already turned out to be unrealistic on the high side. The goal is only 2.2 percent for 1980. Both of these goals are egregiously below our needs and capabilities at almost any time. Viewing the goals for these two years, the President's 3.8 percent average annual growth rate for 1978-1983 is utterly unattainable. It would require a real economic growth rate during 1980-1983 which is pie in the sky in terms of the programs and policies which he sets forth. And it is pure pie in the sky, under these goals, to expect to come anywhere near the goal of 4.0 percent unemployment in 1983, which the president also sets. The President projects a productivity growth rate averaging only 1.5 percent annually for the period as a whole. This is a surrender to the declining growth rate which has resulted from repeated economic stagnations and recessions, and it is not at all consistent with our revealed capabilities during good economic performance years, nor with the requirements for full production.
GDP 1979-1983
The President's goals for major components of GNP also do violence to the requirements for economic balance or for an acceptable rate of real economic growth. By way of example, at the start of 1979, the President projected for that year real economic growth rates of only 1.7 - 2.25 percent for consumer expenditures, and only 0.75 - 1.25 percent for Federal purchases of goods and services. His projection of 4.0 - 4.5 percent for nonresidential fixed investment is far out of balance with the other projections, and unattainable in terms of them. The President also projected for 1979 a real rate of increase in Federal purchases of 0.75 - 1.25 percent. This is also very low, and out of balance w9ith an non-supportive of some of the other goals.
The President commits himself to a "lean and austere" Federal Budget, with outlays rising at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent during fiscal 1979 - 1983, and generally declining from year to year. In ratio to GNP, this would represent a decline from 21.55 percent in fiscal 1979 to 20 percent or lower in fiscal 1983. That might be acceptable in a rapidly expanding economy; it would be intolerable in a repressed and slowly growing economy. Such Federal Budget trends in actuality would portend great losses for the economy and great hardship for large portions of the people.
All in all, to put it mildly the President has committed himself to the contrived development of the recession which is now under way, although in early 1979 his Economic Advisers denied that a recession was just around the corner."
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In any event, the goals are dismal in terms of our needs and capabilities, or in terms of fulfilling the mandate of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.
Indeed, the experience of the economy was substantially worse than Keyserling envisioned in 1979. GDP shrank by 0.3 percent in 1980, recovered to 2.8 percent in 1981 and shrank again, this time by 1.9 percent in 1982. The average for the period 1979 to 1983 was 1.3 percent. Unemployment skyrocketed under Reagan, 10.4 in 1981, 11.7 percent in 1982 and still growing at 12.2 percent in 1983. Meanwhile the deficits of $28 billion in Carter's austere year of 1979 ballooned to $60 billion in 1980 and then ever higher, being $195.4 billion in 1983.
Keyserling's book "Liberal" and "Conservative" National Economic Policies and their Consequences, 1919-1979 draws the end of the "liberal" regime in 1969, with the last four years of this period 1966-69 being decidedly more mixed than the period up to 1966. In 1979, he had not yet experienced Reagan, Supply Side, the Laffer Curve, triple digit budget deficits, massive budget deficits, double digit unemployment (except for two years under Nixon and Ford), the stagnation of wages, and the rest. Nor had he experienced the rise of the financial sector and the Ponzi finance that was to mark the 1990's and 2000's.
In Keyserling's world the overcapacity and under-consumption of private and public goods would certainly lead to serious economic consequences. Others looked at the correspondence of investment and growth and determined that stimulating investment would bring the economy out by itself. Keyserling saw the only road as balanced growth, beginning with consumption, jobs and government outlays. Debt was incurred to finance investment in productive physical assets: factories, machinery, housing. His recessions were imbalances of overcapacity and inadequate consumer or government demand.
Although Hyman Minsky had already teased out the principles of the Financial Instability Hypothesis and the structures of hedge, speculative and Ponzi financing, the role debt could play in extending demand while it destabilized the economy was not obvious in the 1970s. The growth of debt over the next thirty years, public and private, sponsored much of the demand that has kept the economy afloat. And when debt and debt service became too large, the economy stopped. That is where we are now.
The Fed and others believe the answer is more debt and more and riskier investment, but Keyserling would have objected in flamboyant terms. there is plenty of investment, far too much, promoted by years of tax concessions to business and inadequate support to labor and government outlays.
Demand Side sees government outlays and debt restructuring in the private sector as being the two pillars of any recovery. The government spending needs to come in the form of needed infrastructure investment, physical and social, and green jobs. The debt restructuring needs to be substantial, not only to revive consumer spending, but to return some form of market discipline to the financial sector.








